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INTRODUCTION
As phenomenological philosophy gets better
known in general in contemporary society, and
there is general awareness that it has developed a
method, more scientists interested in studying
experiential phenomena are turning to the use of
the phenomenological method. On the one hand,
this awareness and usage is good, but on the other
hand, it often is not realized on the part of the users
that a proper understanding of how to employ the
phenomenological method in the social sciences is
not something about which a consensus exists.
There are several procedures being recommended
presently but not all of the recommended procedures
are acceptable, either according to criteria of pheno-
menological philosophy or sound phenomenological
research strategies. In this article I will examine
six dissertations that claim to follow the phenome-
nological method and I shall highlight some of the
difficulties the scholars encountered and comment
on whether or not the solutions to the difficulties
are appropriate. The criteria to judge the solutions
will be specified and will be based upon pheno-
menology and the logic of research, and not personal
biases.
I encountered this problem because of a recent
requirement imposed upon graduate students at
my institute. In order to help prepare them to conduct
doctoral research in a good way, they are now
required to write an essay critiquing another doctoral
dissertation using the same method they intend
to use. Since all of my students employ the phenome-
nological method in their research, I have been
reading many other dissertations that claim to have
used the phenomenological method. I was surprised
to see the great variations in interpretation of the
method. Consequently, I have randomly chosen
six of these dissertations selected by my students
to comment upon the variations and strategies
employed. Three are from the field of psychology
and three are from nursing.
I want to make clear that the motive for this
article is not to fault the students, nor even their
directors, but to try to clarify the problems encoun-
tered in this type of research and to attempt to
resolve them in satisfactory ways. One of the
problems is that consistent exposure to phenome-
nological thought is simply not easily available
in the Anglo-American culture. Even when it is,
it is usually philosophical phenomenology and
how to translate the philosophical concepts and
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ideas into scientific guidelines is often not spoken
to. Moreover, doctoral students are dependent upon
the advice of their directors and with respect to
concrete research strategies most directors in this
era have been trained in empirical modes of
thought and often had to pick up qualitative methods
on their own. Unlike certain other qualitative methods,
such as grounded theory or certain narrative strategies,
the phenomenological method requires a back-
ground in phenomenological philosophy which
at certain times specifies criteria other than empirical
ones. Phenomenology is not against empiricism,
but it is broader than empirical philosophy. That
is because its method interrogates phenomena
which are not reducible to facts.
To argue that some variations are legitimate
and others are not is not to assume or propose an
orthodoxy. The phenomenological method has
some flexible characteristics, especially when
applied at the level of scientific analysis, but it
doesn’t mean that every variation can be legitimated.
The variations have to be in accord with phenome-
nological principles or sound research practices.
Finally, I will only be considering those methods
that base their legitimation in Husserl. In other
words, I will be dealing with descriptive phenome-
nological methods rather than with interpretive
ones. It would unduly increase the length of this
article if every type of phenomenological method
had to be considered. Now I will turn to the issue
of types of problems encountered in the practice
of the phenomenological method within the context
of science.
TYPE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD
TO BE USED
It has to be borne in mind that the phenomenological
method was first articulated by Husserl (1983),
the founder of phenomenology in the modern
sense, and it was intended to be a philosophical
method. Unsatisfied with the progress of philosophy
over the centuries, Husserl (1965) wanted philosophy
to be as rigorous as the sciences and thus he proposed
a method for analyzing conscious phenomena.
Surely, not all philosophies have to proclaim a
method, but Husserl believed that if there was
going to be progress in philosophical knowledge,
then methodological procedures would have to
be followed. Briefly, Husserl’s (1983) philosophical
method stated that one should (1) adopt the
phenomenological attitude (more on this below),
(2) encounter an instance of the phenomenon
that one is interested in studying and then use the
process of free imaginative variation in order to
determine the essence of the phenomenon, and
(3) one then carefully describes the essence that
was discovered. The above is the articulation of
Husserl’s philosophical method. If one applied
the above method directly, without modification,
one would be doing philosophical analyses. Many
commentators have given variations of this
method and sometimes social scientists apply the
method without modification and it is not
realized that philosophical analyses are being
conducted even if the data seem to pertain to
nursing or psychology. More is required to make
the method scientific. For example, Garcia (1996)
followed Spiegelberg’s (1960) articulation of
the method and it was clearly within the context
of philosophy. No modifications were introduced
when she applied the method to nursing data.
Consequently, some sense of the discipline being
practiced has to be added to the philosophical
procedures articulated by Husserl. We (Giorgi,
1985) ourselves have proposed that a disciplinary
attitude be adopted within the context of the
phenomenological attitude that also has to be
adopted. Thus, if one is a nurse, then a nursing
attitude should be adopted and if a psychologist,
then a psychological attitude is required, and so
forth. The adoption of the disciplinary attitude
brings the proper sensitivity to the analysis and it
provides a perspective that enables the data to be
manageable. The data will always be richer than
the perspective brought to it but it is the latter
that makes the analysis feasible. Without the
strict application of a delineated perspective one
can be pulled all over the lot.
It also should be mentioned that some students
seem to consider it a virtue to refer to as many
phenomenologists as possible when discussing
the logic and steps of the phenomenological method.
However, at this stage of the development of the
phenomenological method there are as many
differences among commentators as there are
similarities. For example, Grant (2004), in legitimating
her phenomenological method, refers to Creswell
(1998), May (1965), Kvale (1996), Husserl (1962),
Schütz (1967), Polkinghorne (1989), Moustakas
(1994), Giorgi (1985; in press), and Geertz (1983).
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Yet, if one put all of these thinkers side by side,
one would not get a harmonious integration.
There are irreconcilable differences among them.
Rather, the researcher has to choose one metho-
dologist and stick with the logic proposed by the
methodologist. One can certainly try to introduce
variations into the method proposed by the chosen
methodologist, but not primarily by quoting from a
different methodologist proposing a different logic.
One would have to come up with an argument
that would be harmonious with the logic of the
primary methodologist.
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION
If one is going to use a phenomenological method
that is based upon the thought of Husserl (1983),
and all selected dissertations meet this criterion
either directly or indirectly, then the phenomenological
reduction has to be implemented. However, it seems
that few practitioners get this part of phenomenology
correct.
Basically, to employ the phenomenological
reduction means two things: (1) The researcher
has to bracket personal past knowledge and all
other theoretical knowledge, not based on direct
intuition, regardless of its source, so that full attention
can be given to the instance of the phenomenon
that is currently appearing to his or her consciousness,
and (2) the researcher withholds the positing of
the existence or reality of the object or state of
affairs that he or she is beholding. The researcher
takes the object or event to be something that is
appearing or presenting itself to him or her but
does not make the claim that the object or event
really exists in the way that it is appearing. It is
seen to be a phenomenon.
These are attitudinal perspectives invented by
Husserl in order to make the descriptions required
by phenomenology more rigorous. Many experiential
errors are committed when current experiences
provoke associations with former experiences and
then are subsumed under the latter as identical
whereas they may be only similar, and the differences
could be important. Thus Husserl recommends that
one examine the ongoing experience very carefully
before relating it to other similar experiences or to
relevant knowledge gained in other ways. Similarly,
one often imagines that a situation is in fact exactly
the way that one experienced it only to discover
later that that was not the case. So Husserl wants
to limit our epistemological claim to the way that
an event was experienced rather than to leaping
to the claim that the event really was the way it
was experienced. To make the latter claim is to
make an existential or reality affirmation rather
than staying within the confines of experience.
To limit oneself to experiential claims is to stay
within the phenomenal realm.
Now, as we turn to the dissertations under review,
we find that Garcia (1996), MacRenato (1995)
and Friedeberg (2002) do not mention the pheno-
menological reduction at all, and Trumball (1993)
and Driscoll (2004) mention only bracketing and
do not reference the withholding of the existential
affirmation. Grant (2004) mentions the withholding
of existential affirmation but does not explain it,
nor is it clear that she employed it. Sometimes the
lack of proper application of the phenomenological
reduction is due to the sources used and sometimes
it is due to how the researcher interpreted the
steps of the phenomenological method. In either
case, one cannot say that the phenomenological
method was properly employed.
In relation to bracketing, there is an allied procedure
that is often used although only Trumball (1993)
of the studies under consideration here used it
and that is an attempt on the part of the researcher
to list all of the assumptions he or she has with
respect to the phenomenon being studied in order
to avoid their having a role in the analysis. It is
dubious whether this procedure works. I have
known researchers who were trapped within their
own listings rather than freed from them. But the
major point is that the biases must be recognized
in the very process of analysis. Reflecting upon
potential biases before the actual analysis is no
guarantee that a bias may not still be operating
during the analysis. The two activities, reflecting
upon one’s past experiences in the search for biases
and analyzing phenomenological data currently
being experienced, are too different to guarantee
a bias-free attitude.
THE ROLE OF IMAGINATIVE VARIATION
We mentioned above that the Husserlian pheno-
menological method required the use of imaginative
variation in order to discover essential characteristics
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of the phenomenon being investigated. Of the six
dissertations under review, four – MacRenato
(1995), Friedeberg (2002), Garcia (1996) and
Driscoll (2004) – do not mention imaginative
variation. If this step is missing, and if the pheno-
menological reduction was not properly employed,
then these dissertations would have to be considered
empirical studies rather than phenomenological
ones. Indeed, Friedeberg (2002, p. 31) even states
that she is looking for criteria that would satisfy
an “empirical scientific method.” To satisfy that
criterion would definitely put the method employed
outside the range of phenomenology and perhaps
that is why she neglects to mention the use of
imaginative variation. Nevertheless Friedeberg
(2002) contradictorily calls her dissertation a “pheno-
menological investigation.”
If we turn to Trumbull (1993, p. 92), he states
that “Phenomenological Reduction involves Bracketing
the Phenomenon, Horizontalization and Delimiting
in deriving textural descriptions, followed by Imagi-
native Variation” (capitals in original). Trumball
references Husserl’s Ideas after that sentence (no
pages given), but he cannot be right because while
Husserl does speak about horizontalization in
other contexts, the idea of delimiting and textural
descriptions are not part of Husserl’s vocabulary
and horizontalization is not related to bracketing
in his works. Rather, it seems to me that Trumbull
has taken some of these views from Keen (1975)
and has attributed them to Husserl. In any case,
there is a good bit of confusion in his method
section, including the understanding of bracketing,
but we only want to comment here on how he
employed imaginative variation.
Trumbull (1993, p. 98) utilized imaginative
variation only after he went through the process
of delimitation. Trumbull (1993, p. 96) states that
delimitation means that he “must, from the
phenomenon itself, separate out the central data
from the peripheral.” In other words, Trumbull is
selecting what is essential and separating it from
what is not, but he’s doing it without the help of
free imaginative variation. Then he applies imaginative
variation to the delimited data. It seems to me that
his use of imaginative variation comes a bit late,
and it is confusing when he states that it is applied
to the “delimited data, meaning units, themes and
textural descriptions to determine the underlying
structures and meanings….” (Trumbull, 1993,
p. 98). The steps of the method seem not to be in
proper logical order.
THE QUESTION OF GENERALIZATION
There seems to be confusion about the genera-
lizability of phenomenological data. While Grant
(2004, p. 58) allows for generalizability, she also
states that “It is hard to determine, however, prior
to a phenomenological study whether its results
can be generalized.” However, that is not true.
So long as one can employ the eidetic reduction,
with the help of imaginative variation, one can
obtain an eidetic intuition into the state of affairs
and describe an essential finding that is intrinsically
general. Husserl makes it clear that one can do that
even with a particular experience. I may observe
a specific chair. But nothing prevents me from
switching attitudes and taking a more general
perspective toward the particular chair and seeing
it as a cultural object designed to support the human
body in the posture of sitting. That more general
description is as true as the particular details of
the chair that is taken as an example of a particular
perception. There is no way to prevent one from
assuming such a more general perspective. The
switch results in eidetic findings which are intrinsically
general. The understanding of eidetic findings seems
to be problematic when phenomenology is applied
in the social sciences.
Only two other studies of the six even mentioned
the question of generalizability, and both in a way
that ignored the question of eidetic results. MacRenato
(1995, p. 134) wrote: “Since the purpose of the
phenomenological approach is to gain rich descriptions
of individual experiences or of specific human
phenomena, findings from such studies should not
be considered generalizable,” and Trumbull (1993,
p. 84) wrote: 
I am not interested in nomothetic knowledge
obtained from traditional scientific methods,
nor am I interested in an understanding gained
from observations derived from detached,
“objective,” measuring, testing, categorizing
and classifying ways. I am not seeking
knowledge of laws of generalizations, nor
of averages. Instead, my search is for idiographic
knowledge, or a way to understand the
essences: What distinguishes this pheno-
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menon from all others? What is its unique
character?
Both of these statements confuse several issues.
MacRenato does not realize that the richness of a
concrete description can facilitate the discovery
of an essence with the help of free imaginative
variation. If one does not employ the eidetic reduction
and arrive at an essence or some other type of
eidetic invariant concerning the concrete, detailed
description of an experienced phenomenon by
one or several participants, then proper pheno-
menological procedures have not been followed.
One could then otherwise merely end up with a
summary that is an empirical generalization and
such a generalization has different characteristics
form phenomenologically founded eidetic results.
It is certainly acceptable for Trumbull to want to
have nothing to with “laws of generalization”
but an essence is precisely such a type of genera-
lization. Husserl (1983) admits that there can be
an essence of an individual, but it is still a reduction
of concrete data to its “essential characteristics.”
Yet, Trumbull investigated 14 participants and he
did try to generalize the findings across the participants
because he came up with composite textural and
structural descriptions. Consequently, when Trumbull
stated that he was interested in a “unique” pheno-
menon he did not distinguish sufficiently what
belonged to the phenomenon and what belonged
to the individual. Since many individuals can
experience the same phenomenon, albeit differently,
the distinction is very important. A phenomenological
analysis can deal with both issues, but they are
different problems.
Finally, it is amazing that the other three disser-
tations did not bring up the problem of generali-
zability of the findings at all. Friedeberg (2002,
p. 101) mentioned that further research might
further clarify some of her findings, but she never
mentioned just what the limits were with respect
to generalization. She did admit that she (Friedeberg,
2002, p. 45) had biases that she did not believe
that she could eliminate, nor did she want to.
Rather she thought that the better strategy was to
address them, presumably in the course of the
research. She is free, of course, to choose that
option, but it does remove her from a genuine
descriptive phenomenological method, which
she claims her dissertation to be. Neither Driscoll
(2004) nor Garcia (1996) raised this issue, and as
a consequence it renders the interpretation of their
findings more ambiguous than need be.
THE ISSUE OF THE VERIFICATION
OF FINDINGS
There is not space in this article to go into the
whole issue of validity and reliability with respect
to phenomenological results, but I do want to respond
to certain practices that are being performed in
some phenomenological dissertations, as well as
published articles (e.g., Arminio, 2001), regarding
alleged verification of findings. The two strategies
involve the use of judges in some form or other,
and the presentation of the findings to the parti-
cipants for them to verify. From a phenomenological
perspective, both strategies are misguided. Driscoll
(2004, p. 55), for example, wrote that “… three
colleagues were asked to review the exhaustive
descriptions: two advanced practice registered
nurses in psychiatry and a psychiatrist. They agreed
with the accuracy of the description based on
their experience of caring for women with bipolar
II disorder.” At best, this procedure might result
in some type of “face validity” but it could not
function to ascertain genuine validity. For example,
suppose an in-depth analysis of the result came
up with a completely new finding. Could the
experienced nurses judge that it belonged to the
experience of bipolar disorder based on their past
experience with such patients? The new finding
is justified on the basis of all of the new data
collected, not on the past experience of experts.
Besides, this strategy is motivated by empirical
considerations, not phenomenological ones.
However, a major step that was employed for
validity was the use of informant or participant
review of the results with which the researchers
came up (Driscoll, 2004; Friedeberg, 2002; Garcia,
1996; MacRenato, 1995). This is a step advocated
by Colaizzi (1978), and so if a researcher adopts
his method, he or she includes this step. What
this step involves is that the researcher presents
her findings to the participants for the purpose of
verification, and if the participant offers corrections,
then according to Colaizzi, those corrections must
be accepted. However, there are several reasons
why this step does not survive critical scrutiny.
First, there are two theoretical reasons for not
using this step. The participants describe their
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experiences from the perspective of everyday
life, from the perspective of the natural attitude.
The analysis is performed from the phenome-
nological perspective plus from a disciplinary
perspective (psychology, nursing, and so forth).
The phenomenological attitude properly employed
results in eidetic findings that can only be checked
by phenomenological procedures. It cannot be
assumed that the ordinary person is aware of
those procedures, so the so-called verification by
the participant has to remain dubious. Secondly,
since there is a disciplinary perspective, the findings
should be loaded with the discipline’s orientation,
which again means that some expertise is required
in order to understand the results. The purpose of
the research is not to clarify the experience that
the individuals have for their own sake, but for
the sake of the discipline. All six dissertations
claim to want to understand the phenomenon that
is being researched, and the discussions all relate
to the research literature in the discipline. The
research is undertaken in order to understand certain
disciplinary phenomena in a more adequate way.
Whether or not the individual participant agrees
with the findings is beside the point. There is a
confusion here of goals: this is knowledge for
the discipline, not for the individual (more on
this below). Now, to avoid misunderstanding, it
does not mean that a phenomenological method
cannot be used to clarify an individual’s experience.
But if so, then the researcher does not need multiple
participants, but multiple instances of an experience
from the same participant. Even then, the findings
should be mediated by the researcher so that they
can be made comprehensible for the participant.
Also, my stance does not mean that findings cannot
be shared with curious participants. They can, but
not for purposes of verification or correction. But it
can be a nice gesture since participants gave of
their time and energy so that the researcher could
complete his or her project.
But there is still another theoretical reason for
not employing the step of having participants verify
phenomenological findings. The assumption behind
the procedure is that the experiencer is also the
best judge of the meaning of the experience. But
it is not at all clear that that assumption is true,
as any experienced therapist can verify. Merleau-
Ponty (1964, p. 54) puts it this way: “The insight
into essences rests simply on the fact that in our
experience we can distinguish the fact that we
are living through something from what it is we
are living through in this fact” (Italics in original).
When a researcher presents phenomenological
findings back to a participant, he or she is asking
them to confirm what was lived through. The
participant may not have even thought about that
issue. Participants are surely privileged when it
comes to what they experienced, but not necessarily
concerning the meaning of their experience. The
findings, if properly obtained, are concerned with
meanings of experience. Again, Merleau-Ponty
(1964, p. 65) makes a critical but insightful point
when he writes: “Reflection on the meaning or
essence of what we live through is neutral to the
distinction between internal and external experience”
(Italics in original). Consequently, there is no
privilege on the part of the experiencer and to use
participants as validity checks is not trustworthy.
Of course, it doesn’t mean that the researcher is
necessarily always correct, but given the alleged
expertise in the ways of phenomenology and the
amount of effort that went into the analysis of
the raw data as opposed to a simple reading of
the findings and a non-methodical response to
them, I would bet on the researcher.
The last comment brings up a practical reason
for not employing the procedure. One must remember
that the application of the phenomenological method
is a time consuming, painstaking procedure. If at
the end of this long process, when the final eidetic
structure is shared with the participant, one allows
a single reaction on his or her part to be a sufficient
reason to change the structure, the results of pheno-
menological analysis are fragile indeed. Moreover,
if such confidence is placed in the participant’s
experience, then why not simply ask her what
her experiences mean to her and simply jot them
down? Why go through such a long procedure
and possibly not get it right, when a simple word
from the experiencer can presumably tell the researcher
exactly what needs to be known? Yet Colaizzi
(1978, p. 62) emphasizes, “Any relevant new data
that emerges from these interviews [participants’
feedback] must be worked into the final product
of the research” (Italics in original). It seems to
me the reasons for not including this step are far
more compelling than any possible reason for
including it.
Moreover, other problems can emerge. Driscoll
(2004) included the validity step in her dissertation.
She (Driscoll, 2004, p. 57) states: “Colaizzi’s
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(1978) seven step method for data analysis was
followed which included returning to the parti-
cipants for a review and validation of the final
exhaustive description. Seven of the 11 women
responded to the exhaustive description.” Driscoll
goes on to say that, on the whole, the participants
approved of her “exhaustive description” but there
were suggestions made to add some clarifications
and Driscoll added them. But what about the
four participants who did not respond? What are
we to make of that fact? Could it be that they did
not agree with the exhaustive description? Is that
why they did not respond? Of course, there could
be other reasons for the lack of response, but
since this is such an important step for this method,
how could the researcher remain content with
less than 100% feedback?
There is another variation on this “feedback
by participants” issue and it is confounded with
another problem, the problem of whether one
concentrates on the phenomenon or on the individual
in the research. But first let me address how the
“feedback by participants” issue comes up again.
Friedeberg (2002) decided that she wanted to
study the phenomenon of countertransference as
experienced by therapists and she wanted to use
a qualitative method. She states that she explored
Giorgi’s (1985b) method, and while she appreciated
the rigor of the steps, she did not think that she
could go along with the third step. Her reasoning
was that since psychotherapy was a collaborative
effort, she wanted the raw data to be collaborative
rather than simply being constituted by the participants,
who were three practicing therapists. Consequently,
she allowed herself to be completely dialogical
with respect to the obtaining of the raw data.
Nevertheless, the phenomenon she was interested
in studying was “psychotherapists’ experiences
moving through countertransference toward empathy.”
Friedeberg stressed the relationship that is required
for therapy to take place and therefore argued for
a collaborative approach.
Her justification for the collaboration is based
in part on other situations wherein psychologists
sympathetic to phenomenology used collaborative
strategies. She (Friedeberg, 2002, pp. 31-32) refers
to C. Fischer, who used collaborative strategies
in a testing situation and Gendlin, who also worked
with therapeutic settings. The underlying commonality
here is that the individual is the focus of the process
rather than the phenomenon. The phenomenon is
subordinated to the individual. Thus, despite what
Friedeberg wrote – that the researcher is interested
in the phenomenon of countertransference – the
real focus of the study is how two therapists (researcher
and participant) talk about countertransference’s
effect on one of them. The raw data is no longer
the experience of the participant with respect to
countertransference but it includes the interpretation
of the researcher – a therapist’s reaction to how
another therapist (the participant) is experiencing
the effects of countertransference. Because of this
interaction, the raw data is no longer “clean” as
would be required by rigorous research strategies.
Friedeberg doesn’t seem to realize that when an
interviewer more or less effaces herself in order
to give room for the participant’s experience to
emerge, the situation is still dialogal. Without the
questions of the researcher-interviewer, the participant
would not know what to say. But, whatever is the
case in therapy, in research, even if the situation
is dialogal (and how could it not be?), it does not
mean that the researcher gets equal billing with
the participant. 
Friedeberg (2002, p. 32) admits being influenced
by Moustakas (1994) in her design and they both
implicitly value the experience of the individual
along with the phenomenon that is being researched.
They critique Giorgi’s method because they state
that the individual disappears in the application
of the phenomenological method as he utilizes it.
However, neither realize that their critique confuses
the goal of research with its method. Giorgi is a
basic researcher who applies the method in general
for uncovering essential characteristics of a specific
phenomenon regardless of whom the experiencer
is. The phenomenon is what stands out and to
have a specific individual’s experience submerge
is part of the design. With this goal, the contributions
of specific individuals is typified so that general
findings can prevail. However, the integrity of
the individual experience is not violated in Giorgi’s
method. That is because the generalization happens
with the intentional relationships with the world
and others remaining intact. The typical findings
are expressed structurally, not isolatedly. On the
other hand, should one want to study an aspect
of a given individual’s experience one has only
to change the goal of the research and the method
is equally applicable. The goal of the research is
not then the phenomenon as such, but a specific
phenomenon as experienced by John Doe. But
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such a strategy does not usually contribute to
general psychological knowledge.
This is something frequently encountered
when psychologists with therapeutic interests
undertake research. Their therapeutic interests are
often not sufficiently bracketed and they conflate
good research design principles with therapeutic
practices. Thus, because the therapeutic situation
is dialogal, Friedeberg (2002, p. 45) believed that
her research setting had to be dialogal in the same
sense and so she made her own responses part of
the raw data. The logic is not sound. She was
interviewing therapists about their experience of
countertransference with their clients and her
role should simply have been to listen and, when
necessary, to evoke deeper descriptions, but not
to participate in the experiential descriptions as a
psychotherapist. If her interest were truly in the
phenomenon of countertransference then the indivi-
dual ways that her participants dealt with that
phenomenon had to be typified and not heightened
as idiosyncratic responses. Otherwise her data
could only speak to the individual ways that her
participants experienced countertransference and
no generalization would be possible. One cannot
follow therapeutic interests and research interests
in the same study. They should be kept separate.
A therapeutic attitude should be adopted for therapy
and a research attitude for research, even if one
is doing research on a therapeutic relationship.
* * *
The review of these dissertations makes it clear
that scientific phenomenological research has
not as yet come of age. Unfortunately, I believe
that the results encountered here are typical. The
basic principles of phenomenology are often cited
correctly but they are not fully understood nor
are they always implemented correctly. Thus, when
approaching social science research with pheno-
menological titles, one must be wary concerning
what will be found.
Given that evaluation, it is well to remind ourselves
that the last word regarding this type of research
has hardly been spoken. It is also good to remind
ourselves that when natural scientific psychology
got started, it too groped about for a while before
certain practices were refined and became acceptable.
The chief drawback, as mentioned at the beginning,
is the lack of proper exposure to sound phenome-
nology. It happens in the philosophy departments,
but those lectures are either directed toward
philosophical issues or are expositions of philosophical
texts. That is all to the good, but what is also
required are many discussions concerning how
to mediate between the fundamental concepts of
philosophical phenomenology and the practices
of sound scientific research. This mediation will
not be easy to accomplish because the habits of
thought and practices are so solidly empirical among
today’s social scientists that it may simply require a
new generation with a new frame of mind to
bring about the required transformations. But
nothing should prevent us from continuing to try
to improve the quality of scientific phenomenological
research, but that cannot take place unless we
first acknowledge that what is being practiced
today needs improvement.
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ABSTRACT
While it is heartening to see that more researchers
in the field of the social sciences are using some version
of the phenomenological method, it is also disappointing
to see that very often some of the steps employed do
not always follow phenomenological logic. In this
article several dissertations are reviewed in order to
point out some of the difficulties that are encountered
in attempting to use some version of the phenomenolo-
gical method. Difficulties encountered centered on the
phenomenological reduction, the use of imaginative
variation and the feedback to subjects.
Key words: Phenomenological method, research strategies,
participant feedback.
RESUMO
Embora seja encorajador verificar que há mais inves-
tigadores no domínio das ciências sociais que estão a
utilizar alguma versão do método fenomenológico, é
igualmente desapontante que muitas vezes os passos
empregues nem sempre seguem a lógica fenomenológica.
Neste artigo várias dissertações são analisadas de forma
a realçar algumas dificuldades encontradas para tentar
usar alguma versão do método fenomenológico centrada
na redução fenomenológica, o uso de variações imagi-
nativas e a informação de retorno dos participantes.
Palavras-chave: Método fenomenológico, estratégias
de investigação, informação de retorno dos participantes.
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